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This article provides an outline 
of why inequality continues to 
increase and the implications it 
will have on policies. The authors 
argue that the current policies 
promote a lack of contribution 
from the very rich and target 
low and middle income families 
which has resulted in a more 
fragile economy and harsher and 
unequal conditions in society.
The crisis has brought income distribution, 
and the issue of increasing inequality, to 
the front of the policy debate. As is widely 
documented, (IMF, 2007; OECD, 2008; Piketty 
and Saez, 2013; Piketty, 2013; Piketty et al., 
2011), inequality increased substantially, both 
in developed and in emerging economies, 
starting from the late 1970s. There are reasons 
to believe that the increase in inequality 
was one of the determinants of increasing 
imbalances in the world economy which 
enhanced the fragility of the economy at the 
outset of the global financial crisis (Fitoussi 
and Saraceno, 2010, 2011). The crisis in turn 
deepened inequality and has created  
a vicious cycle that is imposing large social 
costs especially in European countries (iAGS, 
2013; OECD, 2011; Pickett, 2013; Stiglitz, 
2013). But why did inequality increase in the 
first place? And what generated the vicious 
cycle between economic performance and 
income distributions? What does this imply 
for the policies to be followed in the current 
situation and in the years to come? This article 
will outline an answer to all these questions.
The Traditional View on 
Increasing Inequality
The relationship between income 
distribution and economic performance did not 
play an important role in the economic debate 
of the past four decades due to the revival of 
the neoclassical tradition after the Keynesian 
crisis of the 1970s. Neoclassical theory 
postulates that incomes are “objectively” 
determined by the fundamentals of the 
economy, namely the marginal productivity of 
factors of production. This postulate leads to 
the traditional textbook dichotomy between 
efficiency and fairness, that underlies the 
concept of Pareto optimality, and has long fed 
the idea that the economist’s job is to study the 
conditions for optimal allocation of resources 
among participants to the economic process (in 
order to maximize social welfare). Once overall 
welfare is maximized, economists left the 
task of choosing the distribution of income to 
sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, 
provided this distribution did not distort the 
incentives of agents.
With this in mind, the increase of inequality 
would be explained by the joint operation 
of two phenomena. The first is the swift 
technological progress that characterized the 
end of the twentieth century; these advances 
are mostly linked to the IT revolution and 
to the diffusion of computers that mostly 
benefited high-skill workers, to the detriment 
of those with no or little education (Katz and 
Autor, 1999; Rajan, 2010). According to the 
traditional view, the second phenomenon 
impacting wage inequality is globalisation.  
The entrance of low-skilled workers, from 
emerging and developing economies, into 
the global labour market lowered the average 
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marginal productivity of labour. Furthermore, 
increased competition increased pressure on 
unions and wage setters to eliminate wage 
rigidities (see e.g. Card et al., 2004). The 
consequence of this has been a reduction of 
labour’s share of national income with respect 
to capital. Skill-based technical progress and 
increased competition in the globalised labour 
market would explain increasing (wage) 
inequality as an ineluctable process that policy 
was not supposed to address unless at the 
price of reduced efficiency and growth. The 
idea that the “tide lifts all boats” would serve 
as a justification for the extraordinary growth 
of high and very high incomes (the “superstar 
economy”, see Dew-Becker & Gordon 2005) 
that accompanied the two prosperous decades 
1990s and 2000s.
Merit or Predation?
The financial crisis challenged the 
traditional view. First, because in spite of 
the heavy hit taken by the financial sector, 
it disproportionately hit people on middle 
and low incomes (OECD, 2011; Stiglitz, 
2013). Second, because it called for a deeper 
understanding of the impact of income 
distribution on economic performance beyond 
its effects on incentives. The crisis marked in 
effect the arrival point of a process during 
which inequality either depressed growth, or 
triggered increasing debt by households at  
the bottom of the distribution (Cynamon  
and Fazzari, 2008; Fitoussi and Saraceno, 
2010, 2011).
In particular, Galbraith (2012) and 
Stiglitz (2013) highlight that much more 
than fundamentals, like globalisation and 
technological progress, what accounts for most 
of the increase of inequality in the past decades 
is the rise of predatory behavior. Precisely 
because the elites have been appropriating 
more than a fair share of national wealth, 
increasing inequality has been hampering well-
being and distorting the economy. The rise of 
the rent-seeking and predatory behaviour has 
coincided with the paramount role played by 
an increasingly deregulated financial system, 
where the disconnect between wages and 
marginal productivity quickly became evident. 
Galbraith and Stiglitz argue convincingly that 
most of the top earners gradually specialised 
in maximising the part of the pie they 
appropriated instead of contributing to making 
the pie larger. Predatory lending and abusive 
credit card practices, that lie at the core of the 
subprime bubble, are the most typical examples 
of rent-seeking behaviour that transferred vast 
amounts of resources from the lower and the 
middle classes to the rich and the very rich.
Emphasising rent-seeking helps explain 
why the increase of income inequality in the 
past decades benefited the very top incomes 
(Piketty et al., 2011); more importantly, it 
also highlights the importance of policy 
choices. The economic power of the elites 
and the conservative revolution in politics 
mutually reinforced each other, leading to 
increasingly less progressive tax systems, and to 
a downsising of the welfare state. (Creel and 
Saraceno, 2010; Hacker and Pierson, 2010).
High returns in finance, and its increasing 
weight in GDP, triggered a vicious loop by 
which no real sector investment could compete 
with the yields offered by the financial sector. 
The result, Galbraith and Stiglitz argue, has 
been an enormous siphoning of resources from 
productive uses of savings into financial assets 
whose value was mostly inflated. The tendency 
of advanced economies to jump from bubble 
to bubble can therefore be explained, among 
other things, by the increase in inequality  
(see also Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2011).
Rent-seeking and the rise of finance seem 
more convincing than the traditional view in 
explaining the rise of the superstar economy. 
After all, it is hard to relate the top executive 
incomes to their marginal contribution to  
the revenues of their firm, not to mention 
social welfare.
Inequality and the European 
Crisis
Since 2010 the global crisis evolved into 
a European sovereign debt crisis, unveiled by 
serious public financial problems in Greece. 
Instead of being interpreted as the sign of 
major problems with the governance of 
the Eurozone (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2013; 
Saraceno, 2013), it was tackled by European 
leaders as a problem of fiscal profligacy. 
Why a private debt problem, say in Spain 
and Ireland, became a public debt problem 
was not a question really investigated by the 
European authorities (Fitoussi, 2013). The 
consequence has been generalised austerity, 
in the periphery as well as in the core of the 
Eurozone, which stifled growth and delayed 
recovery. More importantly, austerity policies 
and liberal structural reforms disrupted the 
social fabric, especially in peripheral countries, 
and further deepened inequality. While profits 
and top earnings are today at the pre-crisis 
levels, an increasing part of the population 
lives at the threshold of poverty, and high 
unemployment is present in particular sections 
of society (women and youth; see iAGS, 
2013). The course taken by policies in Europe 
remains a puzzle, confronted with a balance 
sheet recession which constrains the private 
sector to deleverage, there is no reason to 
deleverage the public sector as well, especially 
when the banking sector is rationing credit to 
the private agents. Confronted with a rate of 
unemployment historically high and in some 
countries higher than in the thirties, it is not 
such a good idea to foster supply policies 
(Saraceno, 2014). The result is an increasing 
fear of deflation in the euro area whose 
consequences on debts, whether private or 
public, would be awkward. 
In other words Europe, more than the 
rest of the world, has entered a vicious cycle, 
in which inequality makes the crisis harder, 
and the crisis in turn has unequal effects on 
different social and income groups, therefore 
further deepening inequality and increasing  
the fragility of the economy. 
This is not the place to discuss the roots 
of the European crisis, or to assess future 
perspectives (cf. Fitoussi, 2013). The policies 
followed by European countries, austerity and 
supply side reforms at a time when the root  
of the problem is aggregate demand, were  
not inevitable. These policies contributed  
a great deal to deepening the recession, and  
to imposing large costs to low and middle 
income families (and to small and medium 
enterprises), thus making inequality, and the 
ensuing economic fragility, harsher. These 
policies leave no way to discover the real 
potential rate of growth of the economy; 
instead they are favouring a chaotic path: 
growth through bubbles followed by financial 
and economic crises. ■
Europe, more than the rest of the world, has 
entered a vicious cycle, in which inequality 
makes the crisis harder, and the crisis in turn has 
unequal effects on different social and income 
groups, therefore further deepening inequality 
and increasing the fragility of the economy.
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